Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability

Products liability law has witnessed a long debate over whether manufacturers should be held strictly liable for the injuries that products cause. Recently, some have argued that psychological research on human judgment supports adopting a regime of strict enterprise liability for injuries caused by product design. These new proponents of enterprise liability argue that the current system, in which manufacturer liability for product design turns on the manufacturer\u27s negligence, allows manufacturers to induce consumers into undertaking inefficiently dangerous levels or types of consumption. In this paper we argue that the new proponents of enterprise liability have: (1) not provided any more than anecdotal evidence for their thesis; (2) failed to account for the mechanisms the law already has available to counter manufacturer manipulation of consumers; and (3) made no effort to address the well-known problems enterprise liability creates. Furthermore, even on its own terms, the new arguments for enterprise liability fail to consider the tendency of some manufacturers to exacerbate the risks that some products pose - a tendency that enterprise liability would exacerbate. In short, the insights gleaned from psychological research on human judgment do not support adopting a system of strict enterprise liability for products

Investigating the Potential of Fee-Based Recreation on Private Lands in the Lower Mississippi River Delta

Private landowners may be willing to allow public access for fee-based wildlife-associated recreation. A survey and econometric techniques are proposed to determine what characteristics may influence the probability to decide to offer recreation, what organizational form landowners may prefer to manage and market fee-based recreation, and how liability concerns and other possible disincentives collectively influence landowners' access decisions.wildlife-associated recreation, liability perceptions, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Understanding Current Signals Induced by Drifting Electrons

Consider an electron drifting in a gas toward a collection electrode. A common misconception is that the electron produces a detectable signal only upon arrival at the electrode. In fact, the situation is quite the opposite. The electron induces a detectable current in the electrode as soon as it starts moving through the gas. This induced current vanishes when the electron arrives at the plate. To illustrate this phenomenon experimentally, we use a gas-filled parallel plate ionization chamber and a collimated $^{241}$Am alpha source, which produces a track of a fixed number of ionization electrons at a constant distance from the collection electrode. We find that the detected signal from the ionization chamber grows with the electron drift distance, as predicted by the model of charge induction, and in conflict with the idea that electrons are detectable upon arrival at the collection plate.Comment: 21 pages, 12 figure

TRUST DEVELOPMENT IN THE TEACHER-PRINCIPAL RELATIONSHIP

The research literature has identified trust as a key aspect in successful school improvement. Major events, such as principal succession or school amalgamation, can affect staff relationships and be potentially detrimental to trust development and, therefore, school improvement. This study examined the nature of trust perception and development in the teacher-principal relationship. Behaviours that affected trust were identified and categorized under two components of trust: The Ability component and the Interpersonal Relations component. Existing models of trust development were examined but found to not adequately fit the transcript data. A new model of trust development was presented. This model takes into account the variable importance of the different components of trust depending on the stage of trust the teacher-principal relationship is in and it allows for multiple aspects of trust discernment for more developed relationships

Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality

In theory, the product liability system should induce manufacturers to invest in product safety at the socially optimal level, i.e., the level at which the marginal cost of the investment equals the marginal cost of product-related accidents thereby avoided. In reality, however, this inducement may be weakened by countervailing incentives, causing manufacturers in marginal cases to forgo investment that would appear to be cost-effective. Professor Henderson argues that in these cases corporate rationality has been imprisoned by two real-world phenomena. First, a manufacturer may postpone product improvements lest they be viewed by potential claimants and juries as a confession of fault with respect to accidents caused by products already on the market. Investment in product safety may not reach the optimal level because its marginal cost is inflated by a concomitant increase in liability exposure from old products. Second, this tendency to underinvest may be strengthened by conflicts of interest between the corporate manufacturer and the individuals who manage it. As in other areas of corporate life, the managers\u27 short term accountability may encourage them to defer long-term investment that may be in the best interests of the firm as a whole as well as of society. Professor Henderson concludes that the product liability system probably cannot free corporate managers from these restraints, but he suggests several ways to reduce the incentives that managers have, both as individuals and as representatives of their firms, to underinvest in product safety